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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2693 
___________ 
 
ERIC LYONS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DONALD KELCHNER; 
RICHARD SOUTHERS, ANDY HUBER; SHARON BURKS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-02278) 
District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 8, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: September 27, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Eric Lyons, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights action 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
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I. 
 On April 5, 2006, Lyons was transferred from SCI-Fayette to the Special 
Management Unit (“SMU”) at SCI-Camp Hill.  Shortly thereafter, the SMU Property 
Officer, Adam Huber, conducted an inventory of Lyons’ property.  Because Lyons’ 
property exceeded the amount that prison regulations permitted him to keep in his cell, 
Officer Huber confiscated a portion of Lyons’ legal material.1  Lyons challenged the 
confiscation of his property through the prison administrative grievance process.  When 
that process proved unsuccessful, Lyons filed a complaint in the District Court.  Lyons 
claimed that he was deprived of his property without due process, challenged the 
Department of Corrections’ (“DOC”) policy that limits the amount of property inmates 
may possess, and argued that his right of access to the courts was violated.  He named as 
defendants Officer Huber, as well as prison officials who had participated in the 
grievance process.   
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Lyons did not suffer a due 
process violation because he had adequate post-deprivation remedies and that he had 
failed to exhaust any claim related to the prison’s policy of limiting SMU prisoners to 
one box of personal property.  The District Court agreed with those arguments, but held 
that Lyons had set forth a viable access to the courts claim against Officer Huber.  Officer 
Huber filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Lyons had failed to 
                                              
1
 Prior to the confiscation, Lyons was permitted to examine his legal materials, select 
those materials that he wanted to keep in his cell, and place the remainder in storage 
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demonstrate that the confiscation of his property resulted in the loss of an arguable legal 
claim.  After carefully examining Lyons’ criminal appeal proceedings, a Magistrate 
Judge concluded that Lyons’ ability to litigate his claims had not been prejudiced by the 
confiscation of his legal papers.  Consequently, because Officer Huber had not violated 
Lyons’ constitutional rights, the Magistrate Judge found that Officer Huber was entitled 
to qualified immunity.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232-33 (2009) (citing Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).  Over Lyons’ objections, the District Court adopted 
the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and entered summary judgment in 
favor of Officer Huber.  Lyons appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “We review 
district court decisions regarding both summary judgment and dismissal for failure to 
state a claim under the same de novo standard of review.”  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. 
Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal 
quotations omitted).  Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that 
party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled 
                                                                                                                                                  
boxes or have it sent outside the prison. 
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to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 
F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006).   
III. 
A. Due Process 
 The District Court properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.  In his 
complaint, Lyons alleged that his legal materials were confiscated without due process.  
Importantly, however, deprivation of inmate property by prison officials does not state a 
cognizable due process claim if the prisoner has an adequate post-deprivation state 
remedy.  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).  Here, adequate remedies were 
available to Lyons, who sought relief through the prison’s administrative grievance 
process.  Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr., 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that prison’s grievance program and internal review provide an adequate post- 
deprivation remedy to satisfy due process).   
B. Failure to Exhaust 
 Notably, however, Lyons failed to use that process to challenge the DOC policy 
that limits the amount of written material an inmate in the SMU may possess in his cell.  
See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing property 
restrictions at the SCI-Camp Hill SMU).  The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the 
“PLRA”) requires that a prisoner pursue all avenues of relief available within the prison’s 
grievance system before bringing a federal civil rights action concerning prison 
conditions.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).  This 
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“exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they 
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive 
force or some other wrong.”  Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).  A prisoner’s 
failure to substantially comply with the procedural requirements of the prison’s grievance 
system will result in a procedural default of the issue and effectively bar the inmate from 
bringing his claim in federal court.  Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2004).   
 Lyons conceded that he did not raise the property limitation issue in his 
administrative grievance.  He argued, though, that he should be excused from compliance 
with the exhaustion requirement because he was not permitted to challenge prison 
policies.  In particular, Lyons claimed that inmates in the SMU may file grievances which 
pertain only to the propriety of their confinement in administrative custody.  As the 
Magistrate Judge noted, however, while there are specific policies that govern challenges 
to administrative custody and inmate discipline, see DC-ADM 801 & 802, the inmate 
grievance review system is otherwise generally available to inmates in the SMU, see DC-
ADM 804.  Therefore, because Lyons had an available remedy to challenge the property 
limitation policy, but failed to utilize that that remedy, the District Court properly 
dismissed his claim.   
C. Access to the Courts 
 The District Court also properly granted Officer Huber’s motion for summary 
judgment on Lyons’ access to the courts claim.  Prisoners have a right of access to the 
courts.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).  Importantly, however, where an 
6 
 
inmate does not allege an actual injury to his ability to litigate a claim, his constitutional 
right of access to the courts has not been violated.  See id. at 352-53.  An actual injury is 
shown only where a nonfrivolous, arguable claim is lost.  See Christopher v. Harbury, 
536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).  In this case, Lyons argued that the confiscation of his legal 
materials prevented him from pursuing a Brady claim in his state Post Conviction Relief 
Act (“PCRA”) appeal and in his federal habeas petition.  The Brady claim was premised 
on the prosecution’s alleged failure to disclose police records pertaining to a purported 
alibi witness, Joan Edenfield.  As the Magistrate Judge’s thorough review of the 
underlying state PCRA and federal habeas proceedings indicated, however, Lyons 
capably raised his Brady claim, but lost because his arguments were without merit. 
 Lyons’ legal materials were confiscated shortly after the PCRA court denied his 
petition.  Nevertheless, Lyons continued to pursue the Brady claim in his appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  The Superior Court denied the claim on its merits, holding 
that because Lyons was aware of the potential alibi, the Commonwealth did not suppress 
information unknown to him or that he could not have obtained himself with reasonable 
diligence.  Lyons reasserted the Brady claim in his federal habeas petition.  The matter 
was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended denying the Brady claim on its 
merits.  Lyons v. Wilson, 2010 WL 2253751, at *16-19 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2010).  In 
particular, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “the Commonwealth was not obligated to 
disclose the police notes from its interview with Edenfield” because Lyons, his mother, 
and a pastor who was assisting in the defense investigation had contacted Edenfield at 
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least four times.  Id. at *19.  In addition, the Magistrate Judge held that “there was 
nothing that prevented [Lyons] from informing the Commonwealth well in advance of 
trial that [Edenfield] would be an alibi witness.”  Id.  Finally, the Magistrate Judge found 
that Edenfield’s testimony was not material to the defense, citing the “overwhelming 
evidence” of Lyons’ guilt, Lyons’ inconsistent accounts of his whereabouts, and various 
weaknesses in the evidence linking Edenfield to Lyons on the night of the crime.  Id.  
Importantly, there is no indication that Lyons’ Brady claim was rejected because his legal 
materials were confiscated.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Officer Huber.    
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.
